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Tribunals Organized To Convict: Searching for a Lesser 
Evil in the Capital Juror Death-Qualification Process in 
United States v. Green1
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many observers were shocked when the district attorney prosecuting 
Andrea Yates, the Texas mother who drowned her five children in a 
bathtub, announced his intent to pursue the death penalty against her.2 
Obtaining capital punishment for a woman with known psychiatric 
problems who is accused of killing her children is almost unheard of.3 
The decision was met by some defense attorneys, however, with little 
surprise: “They may just be trying to get a death-qualified jury . . . to 
ensure a conviction.”4 Sure enough, once prosecutors secured a 
conviction, their aggressive pursuit of the death penalty transformed into 
an endorsement of a life sentence instead.5
Prosecutorial preference for death-qualifying a jury—preemptively 
removing potential jurors who “would automatically vote against the 
imposition of capital punishment”6 or would otherwise be unable to 
perform their sentencing duties as jurors in a capital case—is well 
recognized among criminal law scholars and practitioners.7 Since the 
imposition of the death penalty requires a unanimous jury, prosecutors 
 1. 343 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 2. Lisa Teachey, DA Will Seek to Put Yates on Death Row/Mom Pleads Insanity in 
Children’s Drownings, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 9, 2001, available at 2001 WL 23620392. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See CBS News, Death May Not Be Prosecution’s Aim (Mar. 15, 2002), at 
http://election.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/03/14/news/opinion/courtwatch/main50378. 
shtml. Similar theories arose when the Justice Department sought the death penalty against Zacarias 
Moussaoui in connection with the September 11th terrorist attack—an unusual move since 
Moussaoui was not a direct participant in the attacks; See Philip Shenon & Neil A. Lewis, A Nation 
Challenged: The 20th Hijacker; France Warns it Opposes Death Penalty in Terror Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2002, at A14, available at 2002 WLNR 4438802. “Legal scholars said a decision to 
seek the death penalty would be highly unusual if not unprecedented in a case in which the 
defendant is charged with conspiracy and not with direct involvement in the acts that resulted in 
death,” but speculated that the prosecution wanted a death-qualified jury to increase the likelihood of 
a conviction. Id. 
 6. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968). 
 7. See David Lindorff, Aiming for a Conviction, NATION, at http://www. 
thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20020513&s=lindorff20020502 (May 2, 2002). 
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are entitled to strike potential jurors whose very presence would 
foreclose the possibility of obtaining a death sentence. Many contend, 
however, that once death penalty opponents are purged from a jury, the 
remaining jurors are more likely to find guilt. Since the same jury—a 
“unitary jury”—generally hears both the guilt and penalty phases of a 
trial, death-qualification results in not only a sentencing jury able to carry 
out its duties but also a guilt jury predisposed to convict. Thanks to 
death-qualification, “capital juries are more likely to be white, older, 
predominantly male, Protestant, and less educated8 than other criminal 
juries, and than the society from which they were picked.”9 Critics argue 
that such juries are also more inclined to believe the prosecution, less 
sympathetic to the defendant, and more likely to take a harder “law and 
order” stance than death penalty opponents.10 Consequently, a prosecutor 
who wants a conviction also wants a death-qualified jury. Illustrating this 
point, prosecutors may initially seek the death penalty in order to death-
qualify the jury, even if the imposition of the death penalty is not actually 
the ultimate goal.11 However, such a predisposition for conviction raises 
significant fairness concerns for those potentially facing execution. 
 8. These are precisely the demographics of those most supportive of the death penalty. See 
Joseph Carroll, Gallup Poll: Who Supports the Death Penalty? (Nov. 16, 2004), at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=23&did=1266. 
 9. Lindorff, supra note 7. 
 10. See Carroll, supra note 8. Similarly, more men than women support the death penalty, as 
well as more Protestants in comparison to other religions. See id. Other concerns include judicial 
economy since the process of death-qualification is much lengthier than that of normal jury selection 
and may be rendered unnecessary in the event of a “not guilty” verdict. See, e.g., Craig M. Cooley, 
Forensic Individualization Sciences and the Capital Jury: Are Witherspoon Jurors More Deferential 
to Suspect Science than Non-Witherspoon Jurors?, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 273 (2004); Charles S. Lanier 
& James R. Acker, Capital Punishment, the Moratorium Movement, and Empirical Questions: 
Looking Beyond Innocence, Race, and Bad Lawyering in Death Penalty Cases, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 577, 594–97 (2004); James R.P. Ogloff & Sonia R. Chopra, Stuck in the Dark Ages: 
Supreme Court Decision Making and Legal Developments, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 379, 391 
(2004) (“[D]eath-qualified juries may be more disposed toward guilty verdicts than juries that 
include [death penalty opponents] because jurors who are not opposed to the death penalty may be 
more generally conviction prone than [death penalty opponents].”) (citing Claudia L. Cowan et al., 
The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors’ Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of 
Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984)); Jill M. Cochran, Note, Courting Death: 30 Years 
Since Furman, Is the Death Penalty Any Less Discriminatory? Looking at the Problem of Jury 
Discretion in Capital Sentencing, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 1399 (2004). The method is controversial 
because, as many argue, a death-qualified jury may be more likely to render a guilty verdict. Further, 
given the demographics between races regarding support and opposition to the death penalty, a 
death-qualified jury is logically more likely to be predominately white and male. Whereas most 
whites support the death penalty, most blacks oppose it.  
 11. Lindorff, supra note 7. 
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Despite arguments that the voir dire practice of death-qualifying a 
jury creates a predisposition toward finding guilt, the Supreme Court has 
held the practice constitutional.12 While the Court has affirmed that the 
prosecution is entitled to death-qualify the sentencing jury,13 and that 
death-qualifying a guilt jury14 does not violate a defendant’s rights per 
se,15 the Court has not mandated that a guilt jury be death-qualified 
before the initial guilt phase of the trial or that the same, unitary jury hear 
both phases. Thus, courts are given the discretion to death-qualify the 
jury—with an eye towards the sentencing phase—before the guilt phase 
has been conducted, or to seek some other alternative such as a 
bifurcated jury instead. Although the Supreme Court has not declared the 
practice of death qualifying the guilt jury unconstitutional, that does not 
necessarily mean that such an approach is the “fairest” approach. As a 
result, it seems logical to determine whether there is a better approach 
that can accommodate the prosecution’s right to a death-qualified 
sentencing jury, without trying the defendant in front of a guilt jury 
predisposed to convict him. 
Facing concerns of fairness as well as judicial economy in United 
States v. Green, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
proposed two possible solutions to the death-qualification dilemma: (1) 
impaneling one unitary jury and the maximum number of alternates to 
hear the guilt phase without death-qualifying any of them, then death-
qualifying that same jury and as many of the alternates as necessary after 
a guilty verdict, but before the punishment phase; or (2) initially 
impaneling a guilt jury that is not death-qualified, then, in the event of a 
conviction, discharging that jury and impaneling a new, death-qualified 
jury exclusively for the punishment phase.16 The defendant in Green 
 12. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 165 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 
429 (1985). 
 13. Since it requires unanimity to impose the death penalty, the inclusion of jurors who 
would always be unwilling to vote for death, regardless of the circumstances, would serve to nullify 
the jury process and render the imposition of the death penalty impossible. Consequently, the 
prosecution is entitled to death-qualify the jury before the sentencing phase of the trial. See 
Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 165. 
 14. In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court mandated a bifurcated trial in which the guilt or 
innocence is first determined. 428 U.S. 153, 163, 195 (1976). Then, if a guilty verdict is rendered, 
the second phase—or penalty phase—is conducted to determine the sentence. Id. at 163. A unitary 
jury exists when the same jury presides over both phases of the trial, in contrast to separate juries 
being used. See United States v. Green, 343 F. Supp. 2d 23, 25 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 15. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 165. 
 16. United States v. Green, 324 F. Supp. 2d 311, 331 (D. Mass. 2004). 
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rejected the first option.17 Despite the prosecution’s opposition to both of 
the alternatives that were presented, the court chose the latter option of 
impaneling, if necessary, two separate juries.18
The Green court’s decision fails to provide many of the benefits 
provided by a traditional unitary jury—such as residual doubt—while 
also failing to fully satisfy concerns of judicial economy.19 In contrast, 
the first option of impaneling a single jury and then death-qualifying that 
jury after a guilty verdict initially appears to approach a more ideal 
balance, but upon closer analysis, it creates additional, more severe 
problems, particularly as to the shifting context of the jurors being death-
qualified. Rather than supporting the death penalty in the abstract, jurors 
would be supporting the death penalty relative to a specific defendant. 
This Note contends that although the court’s first option was actually the 
lesser of the two evils in Green, a modification of the first option—
asking questions necessary for purposes of death qualification in 
advance, but not actually using the resultant information until a guilty 
verdict is rendered—would come closer to resolving the many concerns 
regarding capital juries. 
Part II of this Note discusses the jurisprudence of bifurcated 
procedures in capital cases and the evolution and controversy of death-
qualifying the jury. Part III explains United States v. Green and the 
court’s unique rationale for impaneling two juries. Part IV.A analyzes the 
necessary evil presented by death-qualifying a jury and the seemingly 
unsolvable problems that virtually all approaches present, and Part IV.B 
explains why the first option proposed by the Green court achieves a 
better balance of the divergent interests than the second option but is 
poisoned by a fatal flaw. Part IV.C proposes another—albeit still 
imperfect—solution that comes closer to achieving a proper balance of 
the divergent interests by selecting a guilt jury and alternates that have 
not been death-qualified and then asking them the death-qualifying 
questions before the trial commences. The information acquired in the 
death-qualifying process can later be applied to modify the jury 
composition, satisfying the prosecution’s right to a death-qualified 
sentencing jury, if a penalty phase proves necessary. Finally, Part V 
offers a brief conclusion. 
 17. Green, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 25. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See infra section IV.A. 
5SAL-FIN 8/9/2005 2:37:52 PM 
519] Capital Juror Death-Qualification Process 
 523 
 
II. BACKGROUND ON THE DEATH-QUALIFICATION PROCESS 
Bifurcated capital trials and the practice of death-qualifying 
prospective jurors evolved through various cases during the last fifty 
years, the chronology of which provides a useful context for this Note’s 
analysis. 
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence.20
The evolution of the death-qualification process began with courts 
having wide discretion in striking death penalty opponents from juror 
pools and was later narrowed dramatically by the Supreme Court, only to 
be broadened once again—though never to the earlier degree. For several 
decades, states permitted “[t]he broad exclusion of veniremen with 
conscientious scruples against capital punishment.”21 The Supreme 
Court abruptly contracted that practice, however, in Witherspoon v. 
Illinois.22 In a particularly egregious example of when death-qualifying a 
jury exceeds constitutional bounds, the Witherspoon trial judge 
commenced the proceedings declaring, “‘[l]et’s get these conscientious 
objectors out of the way, without wasting any time on them.’”23 The trial 
court then proceeded to disqualify forty-seven veniremen, only five of 
whom explicitly said they could not apply the death penalty under any 
circumstances.24 The others acknowledged “‘conscientious or religious 
scruples’” against the death penalty and were summarily dismissed 
 20. Also relevant to this discussion are various state court decisions in which the practice of 
death-qualification is interpreted under applicable state laws and state constitutions, rather than the 
U.S. Constitution. Because the present case, United States v. Green, is a federal case, this Note will 
focus primarily on Supreme Court jurisprudence in an effort to streamline the analysis. However, the 
applicable state cases generally mirror the Supreme Court cases in terms of outcome and analysis. 
See, e.g., Rector v. State, 659 S.W.2d 168 (Ark. 1983) (supporting the use of a unitary jury); People 
v. Carpenter, 935 P.2d 708 (Cal. 1997) (finding that impaneling the guilt and penalty juries 
concurrently and having both sit for the full trial did not violate the defendant’s rights); Hovey v. 
Superior Court, 616 P.2d 1301 (Cal. 1980); State v. Kilgore, 771 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. 1989) (holding 
that denial of a defendant’s motion for bifurcated jury did not violate his rights as afforded by 
Missouri statute); State v. Williams, 565 S.E.2d. 609 (N.C. 2002) (finding that a capital defendant is 
not entitled to a bifurcated jury); State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994) (holding that death-
qualification does not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights); State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1993). 
 21. Green, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 28 (citing Michael W. Peters, Comment, Constitutional Law: 
Does “Death Qualification” Spell Death for the Capital Defendant’s Constitutional Right to an 
Impartial Jury?, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 382, 382 n.16 (1987)). 
 22. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
 23. Id. at 514. 
 24. Id. 
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without inquiry as to whether they could nevertheless vote for the death 
penalty in certain circumstances.25
The Supreme Court in Witherspoon declared such a death-
qualification process unconstitutional. The Court explained that just as a 
State cannot entrust the determination of a man’s guilt or innocence to a 
tribunal organized specifically to convict him, it similarly cannot “entrust 
the determination of whether [he] should live or die to a tribunal 
organized to return a verdict of death.”26 Acknowledging the 
government’s interest in not impaneling a jury incapable of imposing a 
death sentence, the Court clarified that the extent of questioning must be 
limited to excluding only those jurors completely unable to return a 
verdict of death.27 The elimination of a juror would necessitate 
“unmistakably clear” evidence that the juror would automatically vote 
against death, regardless of the circumstances.28 The Court reasoned that 
striking all who express scruples against capital punishment or oppose it 
in principle29 would produce “a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a 
man to die.”30
Eight years after deciding Witherspoon, the Supreme Court in Gregg 
v. Georgia required courts to bifurcate the punishment and guilt portions 
of the trial, postponing sentencing until after guilt had been 
determined.31 In the absence of bifurcation, a court would have had to 
choose between excluding evidence relevant to sentencing but otherwise 
prejudicial as to guilt,32 or including that prejudicial evidence but 
 25. Id. at 514–15. 
 26. Id. at 521. 
 27. See id. at 522 n.21. 
 28. Id. 
 29. The Court later included as “excludables” those who also would never vote for life 
imprisonment over the imposition of the death penalty (i.e., “life-qualifying”). See infra note 36. 
 30. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 521. Less than four years after Witherspoon, the Supreme Court 
declared the death penalty unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia, citing inconsistencies and 
discrimination in the penalty’s application. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). When the Court revisited the issue 
four years later in Gregg v. Georgia, it allowed for the use of the death penalty, upon the condition 
that states implement various safeguards to protect against the inconsistencies and discrimination 
seen in Furman. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 31. 428 U.S. at 190–92. 
 32. An excellent example of such potentially volatile material would be a defendant’s prior 
criminal history. While certainly relevant in setting forth punishment, such information—unless used 
for purposes of impeachment or other enumerated exceptions— may not be considered by the jury in 
weighing guilt or innocence for the specific crime charged. See id. at 190. Instructions to the jury 
that they should disregard that information in determining guilt is inadequate since jurors would 
likely still have the residual knowledge of such history, weighing against true impartiality for the 
defendant. 
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admonishing the jurors to ignore that information in determining guilt or 
innocence.33 Such a request, however, would have required the jury to 
perform a nearly impossible feat—to temporarily purge their minds of 
any residual effects of that information—to avoid being improperly 
prejudiced against the defendant. 
Gregg drew a clear division between the guilt and penalty phases of 
a capital trial but failed to address whether both phases needed to be 
conducted by a common, unitary jury or whether it would be proper to 
impanel a different, death-qualified jury solely for the penalty phase. 
This question has taken on greater significance over past decades in the 
wake of ever-increasing empirical evidence suggesting that a death-
qualified jury is also more likely to return a guilty verdict.34
In Wainwright v. Witt, the Court broadened the criteria of 
“unmistakably clear” evidence that jurors would “automatically vote 
against . . . capital punishment”35 to include whether a juror’s “views 
would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a 
juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.”36 However, while 
the Court lowered the threshold required for a trial court to exclude 
potential jurors, the Court again failed to state whether the requirement 
of a bifurcated proceeding allows for—and perhaps even demands—a 
bifurcated jury as well, or whether a death-qualified unitary jury is the 
only option. The Court finally addressed that question in Lockhart v. 
McCree. 
In Lockhart, the Court held that death-qualifying a unitary jury 
before the guilt phase of the trial did not violate the defendant’s 
constitutional rights.37 The defendant had challenged the practice on the 
basis of both the Sixth and Eighth Amendments, claiming that it 
 33. See id. 
 34. See infra notes 54–59 and accompanying text. 
 35. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968). 
 36. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 420 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 
(1980)) (alteration omitted). A unique nuance in the Witherspoon line of cases is Morgan v. Illinois, 
in which the Court asserted that in addition to the government’s right to death-qualify a jury, the 
defense is entitled to “life-qualify” the jury. 504 U.S. 719, 724–25 (1992). The Court also referred to 
the process as “reverse-Witherspoon.” Id. at 724. A trial court’s refusal to inquire into whether 
potential jurors would automatically impose the death penalty upon a murder conviction, regardless 
of mitigating factors, is inconsistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
Just as a juror automatically voting against the death penalty would constitute juror nullification, so 
too would a juror automatically imposing death. The Court reasoned that “[a] juror who will 
automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence 
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do.” Id. at 729. 
 37. 476 U.S. 162, 165 (1986). 
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infringed upon his right to a jury selected from a representative cross 
section of the community, as well as his right to an impartial jury.38 In 
the Court’s opinion, “groups defined solely [by] shared attitudes that 
would prevent” them from performing their duties as jurors are not 
“distinctive groups.”39 Even if the death-qualified jury is indeed 
“slanted” towards conviction, such an inclination does not necessarily 
prevent a jury from being impartial.40 Instead, an impartial jury is 
“nothing more than ‘jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and 
find the facts.’”41 The defendant presented ample empirical evidence 
suggesting a predisposition toward guilty verdicts among death-qualified 
juries, but the Court found the evidence unpersuasive.42 Nevertheless, 
the Court assumed the information to be accurate for the sake of 
argument in reaching its conclusions.43
The Lockhart Court also addressed the propriety of the unitary jury 
in capital trials. Reasserting its unwillingness “‘to say that there is any 
one right way for a State to set up its capital sentencing scheme,’”44 the 
Court found no constitutional violation in death-qualifying a unitary jury 
prior to the guilt phase but expressly left open the possibility of 
alternative capital sentencing schemes.45 Alluding to the rationales 
behind a unitary jury—judicial economy, the concept that responsibility 
should be shouldered by those who convict to also fix the punishment, 
and particularly the concern that the defendant should be able to benefit 
from any residual doubts that the jury may still harbor from the guilt 
phase—the Court declared that while it will uphold a unitary system 
 38. Id. at 167. 
 39. Id. at 174. But see United States v. Green, 343 F. Supp. 2d 23, 33 (D. Mass. 2004). In 
Green, the question arose of whether a shared attitude was so polarized according to race and other 
factors that excluding that attitude also constituted the virtual exclusion of certain races and other 
demographics. While 48% of black people oppose the death penalty nationally, only 22% of whites 
oppose it. Id. Consequently, in an area such as the Eastern Division of Massachusetts, where just 
7.8–9.1% of residents are black, death-qualifying a jury runs a high risk of “significantly deplet[ing] 
the already paltry number of minority jurors in the Eastern District.” Id. (emphasis added); see also 
State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 252 n.54 (N.J. 1987) (discussing the consequent exclusion of 
women and minorities). 
 40. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 177. 
 41. Id. at 178 (quoting Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 423). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 180 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984)). 
 45. Id. 
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against challenges, it does not preclude other systems, such as the use of 
two juries, from being used.46
In contrast to the majority’s opinion in Lockhart, Justice Marshall in 
his dissent argued strenuously against the propriety of death-qualifying 
jurors for the guilt phase: “Death-qualified jurors are, for example, more 
likely to believe that a defendant’s failure to testify is indicative of his 
guilt, more hostile to the insanity defense, more mistrustful of defense 
attorneys, and less concerned about the danger of erroneous 
convictions.”47 Foreshadowing the Green case, Justice Marshall 
suggested the propriety of using two separate juries, calling the majority 
opinion’s justification for a unitary jury “unconvincing” and 
“offensive.”48 Rather, Justice Marshall argued that a two-jury system 
would actually encourage greater judicial economy.49 He also left open 
the option of impaneling a single jury but not death-qualifying it until the 
penalty phase, at which time some jurors could be replaced with 
alternates if necessary.50
While the Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of 
death-qualifying a unitary jury for both the guilt and penalty phases in a 
capital trial, it has been careful not to preclude the use of alternative trial 
structures by lower courts that are persuaded by arguments against death-
qualifying the guilt jury.51 The Court’s cases leave open, however, the 
questions of (1) whether the arguments against death-qualifying the guilt 
jury are sufficiently compelling even if they do not rise to an 
unconstitutional level, and (2) what the best structure is to address those 
concerns while also accommodating the government’s right to death-
qualify the penalty jury. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 188 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1283, 
1293, 1304 (E.D. Ark. 1983)). 
 48. Id. at 204 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Marshall found the fear of 
having to repeat the guilt phase unconvincing and deemed offensive the argument that the defendant 
should not escape the unitary system because of its benefit to the defendant. Id. After all, if the 
concern is really what is best for the defendant, should he not have the option of selecting the system 
he believes serves him best? 
 49. Id. “In a system using separate juries for guilt and penalty phases, time and resources 
would be saved every time a capital case did not require a penalty phase.” Id. Marshall also 
suggested that rather than retrying the entire guilt phase for the benefit of the penalty jury, 
“stipulated summaries of prior evidence [could] save considerable time.” Id. at 205. 
 50. Id. at 204. 
 51. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Debate: Are Death-Qualified Jurors Predisposed to Find Guilt? 
The theory that death-qualified jurors are predisposed to find guilt 
has gained strength through recent studies,52 yet the Supreme Court has 
made it clear that such a predisposition is constitutionally permissible so 
long as jurors are still capable of applying the law.53 In holding the 
practice of death-qualifying a unitary jury constitutional, the Lockhart 
Court assumed for the sake of argument the accuracy of the data put 
forth by the appellant suggesting a predisposition of such jurors to find 
guilt.54 Though the Court echoed its findings from Witherspoon that the 
data presented was “‘too tentative and fragmentary to establish that 
jurors not opposed to the death penalty tend to favor the prosecution,’”55 
observers can nevertheless assume that the Court’s ruling would not 
change even in the face of more complete, persuasive data since the 
Court rendered its ruling despite accepting that data at face value. 
Essentially, the Court’s view that the information was insufficient was 
little more than dicta: even if the information were persuasive, this would 
still be their decision. So long as a jury “will conscientiously apply the 
law and find the facts,”56 the jury is deemed sufficiently impartial, and a 
perceived leaning in either direction will not affect that determination. 
Thus, with the notable exception of “jury nullifiers,”57 the Court will not 
likely be swayed by increasingly strong evidence that death-qualified 
juries are predisposed towards finding guilt.58 An inclination of jurors 
 52. See William J. Bowers & Wanda D. Foglia, Still Singularly Agonizing: Law’s Failure to 
Purge Arbitrariness from Capital Sentencing, 30 CRIM. L. BULL. 51, 55–56 (2003); Craig Haney, 
Examining Death Qualification: Further Analysis of the Process Effect, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 133 
(1984) [hereinafter Haney, Examining Death Qualification]; Craig Haney et al., “Modern” Death 
Qualification: New Data on Its Biasing Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 619 (1994) [hereinafter 
Haney et al., Modern Death Qualification]; Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The 
Biasing Effects of the Death Qualification Process, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1984) [hereinafter 
Haney, On the Selection]. 
 53. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 178. 
 54. Id. at 173 (“[W]e will assume for purposes of this opinion that the studies are 
methodologically valid and adequate to establish that ‘death qualification’ in fact produces juries 
somewhat more ‘conviction-prone’ than ‘non-death-qualified’ juries.”). 
 55. Id. at 170 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517 (1968)). 
 56. Id. at 178 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985)). 
 57. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992). A jury nullifier is an individual whose vote 
is predetermined by personal view, regardless of juror instructions or the law itself, thus “nullifying” 
the jury process. See id. 
 58. See Bowers & Foglia, supra note 52, at 56; Haney, Examining Death Qualification, 
supra note 52; Haney et al., Modern Death Qualification, supra note 52; Haney, On the Selection, 
supra note 52. 
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towards conviction is acceptable to the Court so long as the jurors are 
able and willing to apply the law.59 While such reasoning may satisfy 
courts, however, a jury’s inclination towards conviction seems 
tremendously unfair to a defendant whose life potentially hangs in the 
balance. Since the Court has resisted dictating a specific manner for 
impaneling a jury,60 the principle that death-qualifying a jury prior to the 
guilt phase of the trial is constitutional does not preclude lower courts 
from applying alternative approaches to jury selection in the pursuit of 
greater fairness.61
Despite the Supreme Court’s assertions otherwise, various studies 
have demonstrated that the characteristics of death-qualified juries are 
markedly different demographically from other juries. Furthermore, 
death-qualified juries are apparently more prone to finding guilt, have 
higher conviction rates than other juries, and are clearly favored by many 
prosecutors in their pursuit of convictions.62
A death-qualified jury is different demographically from a regular 
jury, particularly with regard to African Americans and women.63 A 
demographic disparity between death-qualified juries and the general 
public is not surprising, however, given the disparity between different 
demographics regarding their death penalty views. According to the most 
recent Gallup Poll, there are substantial differences between whites and 
blacks in their support for capital punishment.64 The data shows that 
 59. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 178. 
 60. See id. at 180. 
 61. Significantly, the decision in the present case, United States v. Green, 343 F. Supp. 2d 23 
(D. Mass. 2004), was justified by issues of judicial economy and by the difficulty of impaneling a 
diverse jury. See id. at 30. The court chose its unique approach of impaneling two separate juries 
without needing to reach the question of conviction-prone juries. See id. at 31. 
 62. See Mike Allen et al., Impact of Juror Attitudes About the Death Penalty on Juror 
Evaluations of Guilt and Punishment: A Meta-Analysis, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 715 (1998); 
Haney, Examining Death Qualification, supra note 52; Haney et al., Modern Death Qualification, 
supra note 52; Haney, On the Selection, supra note 52; infra note 116. Several qualitative studies 
have also found that jurors who were exposed to the potential punishment during jury selection had a 
propensity to believe the subtext of the voir dire was about appropriate punishment, rather than guilt 
or innocence. See Cochran, supra note 10; Maury Albon Hubbard III, Note, Lockhart v. McCree: 
Death Qualification of Jury Prior to Guilt Phase of Bifurcated Capital Trial Held Constitutional, 66 
N.C. L. REV. 183, 197 (1987). However, this concern has not received as much discussion as the 
concerns explained in the main text.  
 63. ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 149 (3d ed. 2002); 
see also Cochran, supra note 10, at 1445. Death penalty juries are often underrepresented by women 
and African Americans. See HOOD, supra, at 149. 
 64. Joseph Carroll, Americans and the Death Penalty: Gallup Reviews Public Opinion on the 
Death Penalty in Wake of Scott Peterson Case, The Gallup Organization (Dec. 15, 2004), at 
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71% of whites support the death penalty, compared with only 44% of 
blacks.65 This stark difference may be attributed to the ongoing debate 
about the overrepresentation of blacks on death rows across the 
country.66 The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that there were 3374 
prisoners on death row in 2003, of whom 1418 were black and 1878 
were white.67 Blacks represent 42% of the inmates on death row, but 
only 12% of the nation’s population.68 While the contrast is not as sharp 
between genders, men are much more likely to support the death penalty 
than are women.69 More than seven in ten men (74%) support the death 
penalty, compared with 62% of women.70 A 1994 study reported that 
while minorities accounted for 18.5% of the people in California jury 
pools the study examined, they represented 26.3% of those excluded 
from jury panels through the death-qualifying process.71 A study 
conducted in 1980 and 1981 demonstrated that at that time, death-
qualification would exclude only 20.7% of whites but 55.2% of blacks.72
Perhaps as a consequence of the different demographics, death-
qualified juries are also more likely to consider the defendant guilty at 
the outset of the trial.73 “In telephone surveys of registered voters 
regarding conclusions they had drawn about actual, ongoing capital trials 
in the interviewees’ county, ‘death-qualified subjects were more likely to 
say they thought the defendant was probably guilty’ (48.3% versus 
37.4%).”74 Furthermore, “death qualification would exclude 54.2% of 
those who thought the defendant was probably not guilty, but only 22.8% 
of those who thought the defendant was probably guilty.”75
 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/content/login.aspx?ci=14371. Results are based on telephone interviews 
with 6498 national adults, aged 18 and older, conducted Feb. 19–21, 2001; May 10–14, 2001; Oct. 
11–14, 2001; May 6–9, 2002; Oct. 14–17, 2002; May 5–7, 2003; Oct 6–9, 2003; May 2–4, 2004; and 
Oct. 11–14, 2004. For results based on the total sample of national adults, one can say with 95% 
confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error is ±2 percentage points. Id.
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Haney et al., Modern Death Qualification, supra note 52, at 630. 
 72. Joseph E. Jacoby & Raymond Paternoster, Sentencing Disparity and Jury Packing: 
Further Challenges to the Death Penalty, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 386 (1982). 
 73. Susan D. Rozelle, The Utility of Witt: Understanding the Language of Death 
Qualification, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 677, 692 (2002). 
 74. Id. (quoting Jacoby & Paternoster, supra note 72, at 386). 
 75. Id. 
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Another survey concluded that whether because of race or merely the 
alignment of one’s social views, there are significant differences in the 
attitudes of jurors who are death-qualified and those who are not towards 
concepts of how the justice system should work.76 Regarding the maxim 
of “innocent until proven guilty,” 55.1% of the death-qualified subjects 
agreed that “[p]eople accused of crimes should be required to prove their 
innocence,” compared with 30.6% of the excludables.77 In terms of 
deference afforded the attorneys, 73.3% of the death-qualified 
respondents agreed that “[d]efense attorneys have to be watched 
carefully, since they will use any means to get their clients off,” 
compared with 54.3% of the excludables.78 The statement that “[t]he 
plea of insanity is a loophole allowing too many guilty people to go free” 
prompted 63.8% of the death-qualified to agree, but only 37.5% of the 
excludables felt the same.79 Furthermore, although 79.4% of the 
excludables agreed that “[i]t is better for society to let some guilty people 
go free than to risk convicting an innocent person,” a mere 51.4% of the 
death-qualified concurred.80 In short, the bulk of the existing data 
suggests that Justice Marshall’s concerns in his Lockhart dissent were 
valid—death-qualified juries are “more hostile to the insanity defense, 
more mistrustful of defense attorneys, and less concerned about the 
danger of erroneous convictions.”81 Not surprisingly, such unique juries 
are also more prone to “guilty” verdicts.82 According to one analysis, the 
death-qualification process produces juries that, in comparison to the 
normal population, have “a 44% increased probability . . . to vote for 
conviction.”83
Finally, and perhaps most disturbing, researchers have suggested that 
prosecutors sometimes seek the death penalty in cases unlikely to receive 
that degree of punishment merely in the hopes of impaneling a death-
qualified jury, thus enhancing their likelihood of prevailing in the guilt 
 76. Rick Seltzer et al., The Effect of Death Qualification on the Propensity of Jurors to 
Convict: The Maryland Example, 29 HOW. L.J. 571, 605 (1986). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 606. 
 80. Id. at 605. 
 81. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 188 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. 
Supp. 1273, 1283, 1293, 1304 (E.D. Ark. 1983)); see supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 82. Cochran, supra note 10, at 1444. Evidence suggests that white, male, death-qualified 
jurors were more likely to convict in sample cases than were African Americans or Hispanics and 
one and a half times more likely to sentence a defendant to death. Id. 
 83. Allen et al., supra note 62, at 725. 
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phase of the trial.84 While what prosecutors believe is certainly not 
determinative as to whether a death-qualified jury is actually more likely 
to find guilt—after all, some prosecutors might also believe that a 
rabbit’s foot in their pocket increases the chance of conviction—it does 
lend additional credence to the theory that such a jury is indeed more 
likely to convict. In a controversial training tape made in the early 1980s 
and circulated within the Philadelphia District Attorney’s office, an 
assistant district attorney urged prosecutors to seek the death penalty in 
as many cases as possible.85 That way, according to the tape, they then 
get the benefit of death-qualifying jurors and can remove with 
preemptory challenges even those who express vague or minor concerns 
about imposing the ultimate sanction.86 In so doing, they could strike 
most minorities from the jury.87 Not coincidentally, the New York Times 
Magazine deemed Philadelphia’s district attorney America’s “deadliest 
D.A.” in the mid-nineties in response to the city’s high frequency of 
pursuing the death penalty.88
Persuasive as this evidence might be, it is still unlikely that the 
Supreme Court will reconsider its ruling on the constitutionality of death-
qualifying the guilt jury unless it becomes clear that jurors are so affected 
by their views that they are unable to apply the law.89 However, this data 
might nevertheless affect the obligations of a court90 even if it does not 
foreclose a specific outcome. In the pursuit of fairness, a court possesses 
the discretion to consider this data in determining how to best approach 
the jury selection for a capital trial. 
 84. Cochran, supra note 10, at 1444; Hubbard, supra note 62, at 197. The “Court declined to 
address . . . the possibility that prosecutors would seek the death penalty, in cases in which they 
otherwise would not, to obtain the benefit of trying their cases before more conviction-prone, death-
qualified juries, and would then waive the death penalty after obtaining the desired conviction.” 
Cochran, supra note 10, at 1444. This decision was made despite the defendant’s argument that this 
was a common practice in Arizona, because the prosecution “did not ‘waive’ the death penalty in 
[this] case.” Id. See also Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 420 n.19 (1987). 
 85. David Lindorff, The Death Penalty’s Other Victims, Salon.com (Jan. 2, 2001), at 
http://dir.salon.com/news/feature/2001/01/02/death_penalty/index.html?pn=2. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Tina Rosenberg, The Deadliest D.A., N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 16, 1995, at 22, available at 
1995 WLNR 3808980. 
 89. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 178. 
 90. See United States v. Green, 343 F. Supp. 2d 23, 35 (D. Mass. 2004) (“While this decision 
does not rest on the conviction-prone juror problem, and its constitutional implications, it surely 
affects my obligations as a trial judge. Death penalty qualification hinders my responsibility to 
facilitate to the best of my ability, a fair trial on guilt.”). 
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C. The Operative Statute: 18 U.S.C. § 3593 
Before examining United States v. Green, one must note that unlike 
many of the cases that have shaped the jurisprudence regarding death-
qualification and bifurcated trials, Green arises under federal rather than 
state law.91 Consequently, a federal statute rather than common law 
mandates when a unitary jury is required and under what circumstances a 
bifurcated jury is permissible. Whereas state laws regarding the propriety 
of unitary versus two-jury systems vary from state to state, and the Court 
has declined to interfere on behalf of either approach,92 Congress has 
expressly set forth the use of a unitary jury in a capital trial. The statute 
mandates that the sentencing hearing be conducted “before the jury that 
determined the defendant’s guilt.”93 However, according to § 3593(b)(2), 
a unitary jury is not required if “the jury that determined the defendant’s 
guilt was discharged for good cause”94 or if it is a resentencing hearing 
after the original jury has been dismissed.95 Since a unitary jury is 
otherwise required under the federal statute, the crux of the issue thus 
rests on the meaning of good cause or the Green court’s interpretation of 
the statute as allowing a defendant to waive the requirement of a unitary 
jury.96 This Note’s focus is not on the Green court’s potentially suspect 
interpretation that such a right to waiver exists in the statute, but rather 
on the solutions set forth by the court based on that assumption. 
Consequently, the solutions discussed below can be adapted to cases 
arising under state law as well, even if the Green court’s analysis of 18 
U.S.C. § 3593 does not ultimately survive appeal.  
III. UNITED STATES V. GREEN 
In a capital case brought pursuant to racketeering charges under the 
RICO statute,97 the defendant—accused of murder in connection with a 
crack cocaine and marijuana distribution ring known as the “Esmond 
 91. Federal law has been conspicuously absent among the Witherspoon and Gregg progeny 
in part because of its relative absence with regards to capital punishment. The 2001 execution of 
Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh was the first application of the federal death penalty in 
over thirty-five years. See Richard J. Wilson & Jan Perlin, The Inter-American Human Rights 
System: Activities from Late 2000 Through October 2002, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 651, 727 (2003). 
 92. See supra notes 44–45. 
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b)(1) (2004). 
 94. Id. § 3593(b)(2)(C). 
 95. Id. § 3593(b)(2)(D). 
 96. Id. 
 97. United States v. Green, 343 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D. Mass. 2004). 
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Street Posse”—challenged impaneling a death-qualified jury to hear the 
trial’s guilt phase.98 The court responded by issuing a Memorandum and 
Order in July 2004,99 setting forth two potential solutions: (“Method 
One”) impanel a unitary jury and the maximum number of alternates to 
hear the guilt phase without death-qualifying any of them, then death-
qualifying that jury and—as necessary—the alternates after a guilty 
verdict but before the punishment phase; or (“Method Two”) decide at 
the outset to impanel one jury, then, after a guilty verdict, discharge that 
jury and impanel a second, death-qualified jury specifically for the 
punishment phase.100 After reviewing subsequent briefing by both 
parties,101 the court selected Method Two: to impanel, if necessary, two 
separate juries for the bifurcated phases of the trial.102
The Green court set forth several reasons in reaching its 
conclusion.103 First, the court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3593 as not 
requiring two hearings before a single jury, but merely codifying the 
defendant’s right to a bifurcated hearing.104 The court also suggested that 
fairness could be a factor in satisfying the good cause requirement to 
dismiss the jury.105 The court acknowledged, but did not necessarily 
endorse, the defense’s contention that “evidence of systematic error” in 
administering the death penalty rises to the level of good cause for 
impaneling a separate jury.106 However, rather than founding its opinion 
upon the assumption that the good cause requirement was met in this 
case, the court relied on the defendant’s waiver of his right to a unitary 
jury.107 Thus, the question of when a unitary jury—in the absence of a 
 98. Id. at 26. 
 99. United States v. Green, 324 F. Supp. 2d 311, 331 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 100. Id. 
 101. The defense rejected the first option and briefed in support of the second. The 
prosecution opposed both methods. See Green, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 30. 
 102. Id. at 35. 
 103. Id. at 33–35. 
 104. Id. at 30. 
 105. Id. at 35 (“It provides an additional ‘good cause’ justifying bifurcating the juries in the 
trials of the capital defendants before me.”). 
 106. Id. at 30. 
 107. Id. at 30–31 (“[B]y objecting to death-qualifying the guilt jury, defendants are waiving 
the provisions of § 3593 that arguably oblige the Court to hold guilt and punishment trials before the 
same jury.”). The court further ruled that such a waiver is permissible: “If the right to appeal from a 
sentence can be waived along with a long list of other rights, surely § 3593 rights can be waived.” Id. 
at 31 (citing United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001)). However, whereas the right to an 
appeal is purely the right of the defendant, one might argue that the right to a unitary trial is a right 
shared with the prosecution. The Green court failed to address this concept. 
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defense waiver—can actually be supplanted for good cause by a two-jury 
structure in a federal capital trial is left largely unanswered.108
The court also interpreted the statute as suggesting that to whatever 
extent it might require a unitary jury, that right can be waived—and was 
waived here—by the defendant.109 Further, it noted that the Supreme 
Court has not held that the Constitution requires a unitary jury nor that 
failing to death-qualify the liability jury infringes upon the prosecution’s 
rights.110 Finally, the court asserted that the government’s concerns 
about impartiality of the liability jury can be adequately satisfied through 
“probing and exhaustive”111 voir dire and that concerns about witnesses 
testifying in multiple proceedings can be easily remedied using 
videoconferencing, transcripts, and stipulations.112
The court never explicitly reached the question of skewing the jury 
to be more conviction-prone,113 but instead based its decision on 
principles of judicial efficiency and the likely difficulties of assembling a 
jury given Massachusetts’ unique demographics. Affording considerable 
weight to the expense of time and resources required to death-qualify a 
jury, the court reasoned that presumptively death-qualifying the jury is 
premature114 and that “[i]t is entirely appropriate for this Court to avoid 
devoting such substantial resources to jury selection prior to the guilt 
phase when a ‘not guilty’ verdict . . . would render death-qualification 
 108. While the concepts developed in Green can be extended to state courts as well, in 
adherence to relevant state statutes, it is important to acknowledge the influence of 18 U.S.C.A. § 
3593 in Green. The court gave little consideration to its initial option, after the defense rejected it, of 
impaneling a single jury but not death-qualifying it unless the jury returns a guilty verdict. Green, 
343 F. Supp. at 31. Since the court was potentially reliant on the defense’s waiver of its possible 
right to a unitary trial, Id., it dared not risk applying the first alternative which the defense deemed 
unacceptable, lest the court’s judgment be vulnerable to possible appeal under § 3593. After all, if 
the defendant did not approve of the alternative, he could explicitly retract his implied waiver and 
assert his right to a traditional unitary trial. 
 109. Green, 343 F. Supp. at 31. 
 110. Id. at 26 (“[J]ust because death-qualifying the liability jury that may also hear the penalty 
phase does not offend a defendant’s rights, does not mean its opposite: That the failure to death-
qualify the liability jury (while death-qualifying the punishment jury) somehow undermines the 
government’s rights.”). Essentially, the court confined its interpretation of the pertinent law to 
allowing the prosecution to qualify the punishment jury and did not extend the interpretation beyond 
that minimal standard. 
 111. Id. at 31. 
 112. Id. at 33. 
 113. However, the court did briefly discuss the extensive data suggesting just that. Id. at 33–
34. While not basing its decision upon that material, the court did cite the data suggesting a 
propensity for finding guilt as additional good cause justifying the bifurcation of the jury. Id. at 35. 
 114. Id. at 32. 
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unnecessary.”115 The court further supported its decision by citing the 
underrepresentation of African Americans in the jury venire in the 
Eastern Division of Massachusetts, “by as much as half their 
representation in the community.”116 The disproportionately small 
number of African Americans in the jury venire coupled with the large 
percentage of African Americans opposed to the death penalty would “de 
facto exclude all or most African Americans from a death-qualified 
jury.”117 In contrast to its extensive explanation for its departure from the 
standard unitary jury, the Green court did not elaborate on the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of the two methods proposed aside from noting 
that the defense rejected Method One.118
 115. Id. at 33. 
 116. Id. The court stated: 
[S]tudies suggest that death-qualification leads to the exclusion of a disproportionate 
number of black and female jurors, especially in this Commonwealth. Defendant’s 
preliminary data suggests that African-Americans are under-represented in the jury venire 
in the Eastern Division of Massachusetts, by as much as half their representation in the 
community—particularly that 7.8%–9.1% of residents in the Eastern Division of 
Massachusetts are in whole or in part African-American, that a significantly smaller 
percentage are included in the jury venire, that in the United States population 48% of 
black people (but only 22% of whites) oppose the death penalty, and that 45% of 
Massachusetts voters overall oppose the death penalty. Death-qualifying a jury could 
significantly deplete the already paltry number of minority jurors in the Eastern District. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 23. 
5SAL-FIN 8/9/2005 2:37:52 PM 
519] Capital Juror Death-Qualification Process 
 537 
 
IV. ANALYSIS: BALANCING INTERESTS IN PURSUIT OF A BETTER 
SOLUTION119
The necessity of death-qualifying the sentencing jury is apparent, lest 
the presence of jury nullifiers render the imposition of the death penalty 
virtually impossible. It also makes sense that trying a defendant before a 
truly impartial jury, not already leaning towards conviction, is fairer. 
Even if a death-qualified jury is capable of applying the law, few would 
argue that it is preferable for a jury to enter the trial already leaning 
towards a party—particularly when that inclination is towards guilt. 
After all, a key tenet of American justice is “innocent until proven 
guilty.” Thus, the question is whether it is possible to reconcile these two 
divergent interests while maintaining the benefits of a unitary jury.  
This section begins by discussing the strengths and weaknesses of 
the unitary system and the other alternatives presented, followed by an 
explanation of why both options the Green court proposed were 
inadequate. Method Two, which the court chose, sacrifices the benefit of 
residual doubt, while Method One achieves a better balance of interests 
yet succumbs to a fatal flaw. Finally, a new modification of Method One 
is offered which, though still flawed, comes closer to achieving an ideal 
balance.120
 119. For purposes of the analysis below, this Note assumes that the Green court correctly 
interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3593 as providing for a defendant’s waiver of a unitary trial without 
infringing upon the prosecution’s rights. As the Supreme Court has done, this Note also assumes for 
the sake of discussion that the data presented suggesting a guilt predisposition for death-qualified 
juries is accurate, but still fails to rise to the level of unconstitutionally violating a defendant’s rights. 
Nevertheless, courts may choose other approaches in assembling the jury according to their own 
discretion and the weight they choose to afford the concerns accompanying the unitary system. 
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 177 (1986). The fact that the unitary system is permitted does 
not necessarily mean it is the best or only approach. The principal thrust of the analysis, thus, is to 
determine which jury approach, if any, best satisfies the various diverging interests. 
It is also worth noting that while the principal thrust of this Note is focused upon which juror 
selection method is ideal, the manner in which the court moved past the unitary system set forth in 
18 U.S.C. § 3593 is still very significant. If the waiver by the defense is a prerequisite to altering the 
unitary structure, then the court will inevitably be at the behest of the defense. See supra notes 69–71 
and accompanying text. However, if the court is actually able to alter the jury structure for good 
cause, it would enable a greater degree of discretion to the court in determining and applying the best 
solution possible.  
 120. While this Note is primarily focused on federal law, these principles are fairly universal 
in potentially applying to various states. 
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A. Strengths and Weakness of the Unitary System and Its Alternatives 
The Supreme Court has held that the unitary system, even when the 
jury is death-qualified in advance, is constitutional.121 Part of the 
rationale includes the advantages that the unitary system offers.122 Those 
advantages include the notion that the jury that has “the responsibility for 
determining guilt or innocence must also shoulder the burden of fixing 
the punishment,”123 the potential benefit to the defendant of any residual 
doubt the jury still harbors postverdict,124 and the judicial efficiency 
interest in not repeating the entire guilt phase for the benefit of the 
penalty jury.125 Further, arguments citing factors such as the defendant’s 
apparent remorse and the role of the victim posit that the cumulative 
impact of the guilt trial, like the concept of residual doubt, bears 
considerable influence upon the eventual verdict.126 Still other 
arguments question the propriety of allowing jury that is not death-
qualified to decide a capital case when the consequence is likely death, 
even if that jury is not directly responsible for the imposition of that 
sentence.127 These ideas all weigh in favor of the unitary system.  
 121. See supra note 37. 
 122. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 180−81. 
 123. Id. (quoting Rector v. State, 659 S.W.2d 168, 173 (Ark. 1983)). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Bruce J. Winick, Prosecutorial Preemptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: 
An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 58 (1982). This concern was 
summarily dismissed as unconvincing by Justice Marshall in his Lockhart dissent: “[T]he State 
frequently would be able to avoid retrying the entire guilt phase for the benefit of the penalty jury. 
Stipulated summaries of prior evidence might, for example, save considerable time.” 476 U.S. at 205 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 126. Whitnan J. Hou, Capital Retrials and Resentencing: Whether to Appeal and Resentencing 
Fairness, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 19, 34−40 (2003). Jurors often consider the extent of remorse shown by 
the defendant and whether she accepted responsibility for her actions in later determining the 
verdict. See id. Similarly, jurors are influenced as well by an apparent lack of emotion. In one 
instance, a defendant laughed during the proceedings, openly engaged in flirtatious behavior with 
one of the jurors and was subsequently sentenced to death. See id. (citing Scott E. Sundby, The 
Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1560–63 (1998)). Discussing the benefits of a unitary jury in the context of 
re-sentencing cases in which a separate jury has been convened for sentencing alone, one solution 
presented was to permit the defense’s involvement in preparing a guilt phase summary for the new 
jury. Id. 
 127. See Rector, 659 S.W.2d at 174 (“Finally, we perceive no answer to the practical 
objection . . . [of] what is to prevent a juror strongly opposed to capital punishment, in an effort to 
avoid feeling any responsibility for a death sentence, from choosing to hang the guilt-innocence jury 
by a vote for acquittal?”). Despite the Rector court’s inability to answer this objection, however, it 
would seem that proper and thorough voir dire could accomplish the task of eliminating, at the very 
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As mentioned above,128 however, the arguments against the unitary 
system—though perhaps not rising to a sufficient degree to render the 
practice unconstitutional—are considerable. Ranging from the potential 
exclusion of certain demographics129 and a guilt-predisposition130 to 
more basic concerns such as judicial efficiency,131 there are ample 
reasons for pursuing an alternative system that can preserve the benefits 
of the unitary system while avoiding problems that a death-qualified jury 
might present. 
The potential benefits of a unitary system, while significant, do not 
necessarily compensate for the disadvantages it also creates. For 
example, in Lockhart, Justice Marshall did not deny the value of residual 
doubt but afforded it little regard as an argument for a unitary jury: “Any 
suggestion that the current system of death qualification ‘may be in the 
defendant’s best interests, seems specious unless the state is willing to 
grant the defendant the option to waive this paternalistic protection in 
exchange for better odds against conviction.’”132 Furthermore, residual 
doubt may not play as significant a role in capital sentencing as 
previously thought.133 Many jurors were unable to distinguish between 
reasonable doubt and residual doubt, and many even took offense when 
asked whether during the sentencing phase they had entertained the idea 
that the defendant might be innocent.134 Further, some states do not 
permit defense counsel to argue residual doubt during the penalty 
phase.135 Consequently, as Justice Marshall suggested, the value of 
residual doubt is not so great that its loss cannot be adequately 
compensated for the benefits to the defendant that jury bifurcation might 
provide. Balancing the value of residual doubt against the value to a 
least, those jurors who would be nullifiers, without rising to the same level as death-qualifying a 
jury.
 128. See supra section II.B. 
 129. Supra notes 63–72 and accompanying text. 
 130. Supra notes 73–83 and accompanying text. 
 131. Supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
 132. 476 U.S. 162, 205 (quoting Michael Finch & Mark Ferraro, The Empirical Challenge to 
Death Qualified Juries: On Further Examination, 65 NEB. L. REV. 21, 69 (1986)). 
 133. Sundby, supra note 126, at 1579. 
 134. Id. at 1577; see also Hou, supra note 126, at 39. But see Christina S. Pignatelli, Residual 
Doubt: It’s a Life Saver, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 307, 312 (2001) (“Residual doubt, in fact, may be the 
strongest possible mitigating factor that a jury uses to determine the appropriate penalty for a capital 
defendant.”). 
 135. See, e.g., Frye v. Commonwealth, 345 S.E.2d 267, 283 (Va. 1986); Pignatelli, supra note 
134, at 312 (“While some states have given residual doubt a prominent role in their sentencing 
schemes, Virginia has declined to do so.”). 
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defendant in being tried before a truly impartial and racially diverse jury, 
the value of residual doubt seems lesser. Nevertheless, an ideal solution 
would provide for an impartial, diverse jury while still retaining the 
potential for residual doubt. 
The judicial economy interest in not repeating the entire trial on guilt 
for the benefit of the penalty jury can be mitigated through the use of 
stipulations and summaries, and balanced by the greater efficiency in not 
having to presumptively death-qualify all capital juries.136 Death-
qualification adds substantially to the time required for a trial,137 and, in 
the aggregate, courts could save considerable time by only death-
qualifying sentencing juries when necessitated by guilty verdicts: time 
and money would be saved every time there is an acquittal. As with 
residual doubt, however, an ideal solution would combine the time-
saving measure of only death-qualifying juries when necessitated by a 
conviction with the efficiency of having the sentencing jury present for 
the entire guilt phase. Such a solution would also incorporate unitary jury 
benefits of allowing the sentencing jury to experience the cumulative 
impact of the trial.138
Method Two, the method the Green court selected, which requires 
impaneling two juries to hear the separate phases of the trial, served to 
cure two problems—judicial efficiency and the otherwise inevitable 
exclusion of black and female jurors—while implicitly and 
consequentially resolving the problem of a jury’s predisposition for 
guilt.139 Regarding the racial composition of the jury, the Supreme Court 
has held that the inadvertent exclusion of certain demographics based on 
shared ideologies does not violate a defendant’s rights.140 However, as 
the Green court noted,141 death penalty ideologies are so closely aligned 
 136. This factor however may be weighed against the simple fact that capital trials represent a 
small minority of the total trials conducted: of the 92,134 criminal defendants tried in U.S. district 
courts in 2003, only 340 were charged with first degree murder, making them eligible for the death 
penalty. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures, tbl.3.4 (2003), at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table3.04.pdf. Consequently, one can argue that any 
judicial economy arguments should be secondary given the small share of the judicial caseload to 
which this applies. 
 137. United States v. Green, 324 F. Supp. 2d 329 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 138. Supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 139. Not only did the Green court allude to this concern, see 343 F. Supp. 2d 23, 35 (D. Mass. 
2004), but by resolving the problem of demographic under representation, the problem of a guilt 
predisposition is also resolved. 
 140. See supra notes 38, 39 and accompanying text; see also Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 
402, 420 (1987). 
 141. 343 F. Supp. 2d at 33. 
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with race in Massachusetts that the “inadvertent” exclusion of minorities 
would actually be a virtually inevitable exclusion. It was also a valid 
concern that considerable resources might be wasted by going through 
the expense and effort of death-qualifying the first jury when the verdict 
might be an acquittal.142 These two concerns were satisfied by Method 
Two. 
Although Method Two facially satisfies the interest in avoiding 
possibly unnecessary expense in death-qualifying the jury, while also 
allowing the court to impanel a racially diverse jury for the guilt phase, 
this solution sacrifices many of the benefits put forth to justify a unitary 
jury—residual doubt, not needing to recreate the guilt phase for a new 
jury, and the trial’s cumulative impact—and essentially chooses one set 
of benefits to the exclusion of another. Rather than have the same jury 
shouldering the sentencing responsibility that instinctively ought to 
accompany determining guilt,143 the court would dismiss the guilt jury 
without allowing it to take on that additional burden. In terms of residual 
doubt, the penalty jury is rendered the same as a jury in a resentencing 
proceeding144 since it cannot make the sort of firsthand observations that 
a jury present for the entire trial typically would. Factors that could 
influence a unitary jury, such as the defendant laughing during testimony 
against him or demonstrating great sorrow and remorse, would be hidden 
from the sentencing jury. Further, while judicial economy is advanced by 
not unnecessarily death-qualifying a jury in advance, that interest is 
actually exacerbated in the event of a guilty verdict. Not only does a jury 
still need to be death-qualified, but the additional burden of repeating 
significant aspects of the guilt phase would then exist. Thus, in terms of 
judicial economy, the court is gambling: time and money will be saved if 
there is an acquittal, but a greater amount of those resources must be 
expended in the event of a conviction. 
The Lockhart Court quoted an Arkansas Supreme Court case in 
asserting: “‘[T]he same jurors who have the responsibility for 
determining guilt or innocence must also shoulder the burden of fixing 
the punishment. That is as it should be, for the two questions are 
 142. Here, the court noted that the defendant had several potential defenses, including the 
argument that the RICO statute did not even properly apply to the defendant. See Green, 343 F. 
Supp. 2d at 32. Of course, even without a clearly discernible defense, it seems elementary that a 
defendant is innocent until proven guilty in the absence of a guilty plea (in which case, this 
discussion is largely irrelevant). 
 143. See supra note 46. 
 144. See supra note 126. 
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necessarily interwoven.’”145 The possible logic behind such an adamant 
belief that those who convict must also sentence may include the concern 
that, disassociated from the moral responsibility of also dictating the 
punishment, a guilt jury may not fully appreciate the gravity of its 
decision.146 Although it may be aware of the possible consequences of a 
guilty verdict in a murder case147—the imposition of the death penalty—
 145. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 180–81 (1986) (quoting Rector v. State, 659 S.W.2d 
168, 173 (Ark. 1983)). The Rector court elaborated, in opposition to having a second jury hear the 
penalty phase: 
Such a second trial would be comparable to having the actors in a play, after the audience 
had left the theater, repeat their lines in a second performance for a few spectators in a 
nearly empty house. Such repetitive trials could not be consistently fair to the State and 
perhaps not even to the accused. Other suggested modifications have included (a) the 
empanelling of a second jury at the outset, to listen to the actual trial, and (b) the 
selection of alternate jurors to replace, in the penalty stage of the trial, those jurors who 
could not vote for the death penalty in any circumstances. The difficulty with both those 
schemes for shuffling jurors in and out of the jury box is the separation of certain jurors’ 
responsibility for the verdict from their responsibility for fixing the penalty. The two 
must go hand in hand, else the common law jury system no longer exists. 
Rector, 659 S.W.2d at 173–74 (citing Joseph A. Colussi, The Unconstitutionality of Death 
Qualifying a Jury Prior to the Determination of Guilt: The Fair-cross-section Requirement in 
Capital Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 595 (1982)). 
 146. Some arguments challenging death-qualifying a juror before the guilt phase cite as 
problematic the discussion of potential penalties before the defendant is convicted:  
Several qualitative studies found that jurors who were exposed to the potential 
punishment during jury selection have a propensity to believe that the subtext of the voir 
dire is that the trial is not about whether the defendant committed the underlying crime 
but about what punishment the defendant should receive.  
Green, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 34 (citing Darryl Green & Branden Morris, Supplemental Memorandum 
on the Issue of Impaneling Separate Juries (filed Sept. 10, 2004, at p. 6)). 
Many persons called for jury duty have never been in court prior to their voir dire, and 
have never been before a judge sitting in her official capacity. In voir dire they are 
repeatedly asked by the judge if they can “follow the law” and impose a death sentence. 
Although this question on its face inquires into a juror’s capacity to return a death 
sentence, jurors are likely to infer that a death verdict is actually required by the law, at 
least under some, as yet unspecified, circumstances. That is, it gets the juror to think “Oh, 
I get it. They’re asking me if I can kill this guy. Yeah, I’ll do that if that’s what I’m 
supposed to do.” 
John H. Blume et al., Probing “Life Qualification” Through Expanded Voir Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1209, 1231−32 (2001) (citing Hirschorn’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Submit Jury 
Questionnaire, 13 CRIM. PRAC. REP. (P & F) 318, 318–19 (Aug. 11–25, 1999)). However, in some 
ways the introduction of possible penalties could have a sobering effect upon the jury, which serves 
to benefit the defense, reminding jury members of what is at stake and the gravity of their decision. 
 147. Whereas a potential jury is unlikely to know the penalty for a noncapital conviction, they 
likely know about the looming possibility of the death penalty when first-degree murder is the 
charge. The lack of death-qualifying a jury might thus lead them to believe that a guilty verdict 
would directly lead to the imposition of the death penalty. In short, jurors may, in ignorance and in 
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the guilt jury can displace its sense of responsibility for the defendant’s 
future execution by reasoning that it only convicted: it was the other jury 
that sentenced him to die.148 Similarly, the penalty jury is compelled to 
accept the verdict given it, shouldering the moral burden149 of sentencing 
without having reached its own independent, beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
belief of the accused person’s guilt.150 In this regard, the result could 
the absence of any information to the contrary, assume the death penalty as the default punishment—
to whatever extent that may affect their appraisal of guilt or innocence. See supra note 62. 
 148. This concept is akin in some ways to a technique used in firing squad executions. See L. 
KAY GILLESPIE, THE UNFORGIVEN: UTAH’S EXECUTED MEN 21–23 (2d ed. 1997). Some members 
of the firing squad are provided with blanks while others are provided live ammunition. All members 
are then instructed to aim and fire. Not knowing whether they had live ammo or a blank, each 
member of the firing squad is able to rationalize that they are not personally responsible for the 
execution. Similarly, a guilt jury not hearing the penalty phase is able to rationalize that even if the 
defendant is sent to his death, it is the doing of the penalty jury and not themselves. Consequently, 
this possibility not only suggests that the jury may not properly appreciate the gravity of their 
decision but also suggests that, whereas death penalty opponents could not render a guilty verdict 
when that verdict would certainly lead to the death penalty, under this scenario they can displace that 
concern onto the shoulders of the sentencing jury. 
 149. However, some studies suggest that even during the sentencing phase, jurors try to 
subvert their personal sense of moral responsibility. See Joseph L. Hoffman, Where’s the Buck?—
Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137 (1995). 
[D]eath penalty jurors resemble the subjects in the famous Milgram experiments. Like 
those subjects, the average death penalty juror is placed “in a novel and disorienting 
situation that pose[s] for him a distressing moral dilemma.” And, as in the Milgram 
experiments, the juror in a death penalty case may seek “a professional, symbolic 
interpretation of the situation to reorient him”—in short, the “mystifying language of 
legal formality” may lead the juror to conclude that the sentencing decision falls outside 
the scope of the juror’s personal moral responsibility, and may thereby cause the juror’s 
“moral sense to be distorted.” 
Id. at 1137 (quoting Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305). 
 150. Various qualitative studies have suggested that jurors in a capital proceeding endure 
significant personal emotional turmoil in reaching their decisions. See, e.g., William J. Bowers et al., 
Too Young for the Death Penalty: An Empirical Examination of Community Conscience and the 
Juvenile Death Penalty from the Perspective of Capital Jurors, 84 B.U. L. REV. 609, 652 (2004) 
(stating that 60.2% of jurors described the experience of serving on the death penalty jury as an 
emotionally upsetting experience); Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital 
Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 26 (2000). To assist jurors in coping with the stress of jury duty, 
some courts are including a debriefing session with trained court personnel, psychologists, or social 
workers: 
Sitting on the jury in a capital case can be an extremely traumatic experience for many 
people. Jurors often experience psychosomatic symptoms, such as headaches, during 
deliberation as an expression of resentment of being put in such a position or from a 
sense of entrapment. Some jurors may rely on intuition or a “gut feeling” during 
sentencing. Others invoke God, the Bible, or religious visions to relieve themselves of the 
psychological burden at hand. 
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very well be a more heightened, somewhat warped version of residual 
guilt. Rather than possessing some residual doubt from the trial, the 
sentencing jury may possess doubt as to the ability of its predecessor jury 
to correctly find guilt. Whereas courts consider traditional residual doubt 
as a good thing—a safety valve of sorts reflecting any uncertainty on the 
part of jurors that they “got it right”—this secondary type of doubt would 
be less healthy judicially, serving merely to undermine the verdict that 
has already been reached without any legitimate basis.151
The absence of traditional residual doubt would present the court 
with somewhat of a quandary. On one hand, the lack of traditional 
residual doubt can be addressed by presenting a summary of the 
proceedings, compiled with the input of defense counsel.152 This 
practice, however, may inadvertently open the door to increased 
skepticism of the prior verdict and the secondary type of doubt described 
above, resulting in a virtual retrying of the case during the sentencing 
phase. However, judicial attempts to stymie this by excluding the 
summary of the guilt phase would, conversely, deny the defendant of the 
potential benefit of residual doubt.153 Even in states where arguing 
residual doubt is prohibited, studies nevertheless suggest that jurors’ 
residual doubt, even independent of any express argument, can be a very 
significant factor.154 As previously stated, an ideal solution would 
accommodate the potential benefit of residual doubt. 
Cochran, supra note 10, at 1447 (citing ROBERT JAY LIFTON & GREG MITCHELL, WHO OWNS 
DEATH? 148 (2000)); see also Nancy S. Marder, Introduction to the Jury at a Crossroad: The 
American Experience, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909 (2003).  
 151. The doubt would consist not of, “maybe I was wrong,” but rather, “what if the last jury 
was wrong, and he’s actually innocent?” This concern, however, would not be derived from any 
actual knowledge of the case, but rather, a lack of confidence in other jurors. 
 152. See supra note 126. This alternative has been proposed for resentencings. See Hou, supra 
note 126, at 34−40. 
 153. Of course, as Justice Marshall suggested in his Lockhart dissent, this need not be a 
paramount concern if the defendant is given the choice of a unitary or bifurcated jury and chooses 
the option he thinks will benefit him the most. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 205 (1986) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Further, while some states do not permit the arguing of residual doubt 
during the sentencing phase, significant data exists suggesting that jurors nevertheless are influenced 
by their impressions accrued during the guilt phase. See Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and 
Empathy: The Problem of Worthy and Unworthy Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 343, 371 (2003); see 
also Hou, supra note 126, at 34 (“Studies have shown that the demarcation between the guilt phase 
and the sentencing phase created by bifurcation more resembles a sieve than a brick wall. Juries are 
incapable of forgetting the guilt phase proceedings and relying only on the information presented in 
the penalty phase to reach their sentences.”) (citing Sundby, supra note 126). 
 154. See William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: 
Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 28 (1987–88). 
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While solutions have been proposed to avoid repeating the guilt trial 
for the purposes of sentencing—such as videoconferencing, transcripts, 
and stipulations155—those solutions do not provide the same cumulative 
experience that the trial as a whole does. Jurors would not have the same 
opportunity to observe the defendant’s demeanor during trial156 and 
other intangible elements—their general impression of the defendant, 
how sympathetic witnesses may have been, and so forth—that might 
affect the sentence they impose. Instead, these proposed solutions 
provide a very limited replacement for actual trial observation. 
Consequently, it seems that the only way for a sentencing jury to have 
the experience described is to actually sit through the entire guilt phase 
as well, whether as a unitary jury or a bifurcated jury wherein the penalty 
jury has already been convened. Significantly, this latter technique was 
employed by a trial court in People v. Carpenter.157
In Carpenter, the court impaneled two juries concurrently, 
designating one as the guilt jury and death-qualifying the other to serve 
for the sentencing phase.158 Both juries attended the trial in its 
entirety.159 The defendant challenged this approach on grounds that the 
very presence of the sentencing jury predisposed the initial jury towards 
a finding of guilt.160 Though this argument lost on appeal and the trial 
court’s approach was upheld,161 the method of calling two juries 
concurrently is still flawed in some of the same ways the Green court’s 
approach is flawed. While the problems of residual doubt and repetition 
of much of the guilt phase are ameliorated by the approach, the concept 
that the jury that convicts should also sentence is not satisfied.162 
Furthermore, this approach is void of any benefit of greater judicial 
efficiency. Instead, judicial economy is further strained by such an 
approach given the need of impaneling a potentially unnecessary 
sentencing jury in advance so it can observe the guilt phase, while also 
 155. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 157. 935 P.2d 708, 726–27 (Cal. 1997). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. The court found that even if the presence of the sentencing jury had the alleged effect, the 
defendant had requested a bifurcated proceeding and could have withdrawn his waiver of a unitary 
jury before the commencement of the trial if he had so desired. Id. at 727. 
 162. In fact, it would seem that this problem can only be met by a unitary jury since the very 
existence of a bifurcated jury signifies that the duties of finding guilt and sentencing are divided 
between two separate juries. 
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going through a second, non-death-qualifying process to impanel a jury 
for the guilt phase. Additionally, this approach may be problematic for 
courtrooms designed to seat only one jury. An approach that enables a 
jury to sit for the guilt phase without being death-qualified, then uses that 
same jury for the sentencing phase without infringing the government’s 
right to death-qualify would be a superior option. 
B. The Superiority and Failure of the Green Court’s Method One 
While Method Two was an imperfect solution, it was not the only 
solution offered by the Green court. Method One—impaneling a single 
jury and the maximum number of alternates, conducting the first phase of 
the trial, and then death-qualifying the jurors in the event of a guilty 
verdict—seems to solve many of the problems faced by a traditional 
unitary jury without raising the new problems that a bifurcated jury 
presents.163 Any concerns of a predisposition toward finding guilt or the 
inability to field a jury that includes minorities would be solved since the 
guilt phase jury would not be death-qualified. By the same token, judicial 
economy would be served since death-qualifying would only take place 
if necessary following a guilty verdict. Concerns of residual doubt would 
be eradicated since the same jury would be determining the sentencing, 
and replacement jurors added during the death-qualification process 
would be culled from the pool of alternates who had been present for the 
entire trial. Further, in contrast to the other approaches put forth, largely 
the same jurors who rendered the initial verdict would also shoulder the 
responsibility of determining the sentence. Of course, this is assuming 
that the majority of jurors survive the death-qualification process. In the 
event that the subsequent death-qualifying process is unable to field a 
sufficient number of jurors to hear the penalty phase,164 the default could 
be to convene a new jury for purposes of the penalty phase only—
essentially identical to Method Two, which, though flawed, is still 
preferable to a traditional unitary approach.165 Despite its apparent 
 163. This concept has existed, but not been utilized, for more than twenty years. See Rector v. 
State, 659 S.W.2d 168, 174 (Ark. 1983). 
 164. This is a valid concern if we accept the difficult demographics faced in some jurisdictions 
such as Massachusetts. See supra notes 39 and 116. 
 165. Some difficulty may arise if this possibility is not clearly set forth at the outset of the 
trial, potentially risking a mistrial. However, this could easily be stipulated in advance. 
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superiority,166 however, Method One has three discernable flaws, one of 
which is insurmountable. 
Two initial concerns regarding this option are that alternate jurors 
added to the jury postverdict may in some ways be subservient to the will 
of the jurors who were on the jury that rendered the original guilty 
verdict,167 and that some of the alternate jurors added to the panel 
postverdict may not share in that verdict since they were not privy to 
deliberations. The first concern could be addressed through clear jury 
instructions at the outset of sentencing deliberations.168 The second 
concern could potentially be resolved via voir dire,169 but might 
nevertheless lead to a more aggravated degree of residual doubt and, 
consequently, a leaning towards life imprisonment rather than death. 
A third concern that arises under this approach, however, cannot be 
as readily dismissed. Specifically, the ability of jurors to truthfully 
answer questions regarding their attitudes towards the imposition of the 
death penalty are inevitably skewed when there is a specific defendant in 
mind. Jurors being questioned about their attitudes towards the death 
penalty at the outset of a trial are able to answer in the abstract. “In the 
abstract,” they do not support the death penalty, but they could impose it 
given certain circumstances. In the aftermath of a trial and subsequent 
guilty verdict, however, any claims to answering “in the abstract” seem 
absurd. Potential sentencing jurors would have a very specific individual 
in mind: the defendant.170 As a result, the questioning—regardless of the 
vagueness and abstractness of the questions asked171—would be 
tantamount to asking the jurors: “Would you sentence this defendant to 
 166. The defendant’s reasons for rejecting this option are not set forth in Green. However, one 
can surmise that the court likely discounted this option after the defense’s refusal because of the 
court’s reliance upon the defense’s waiver of a unitary jury under 18 U.S.C. § 3593. See supra note 
108 and accompanying text. 
 167. “No one knows what occurs in the jury room but the jury itself, and the jury is not 
accountable to any higher power.” Cochran, supra note 10, at 1443. 
 168. However, as seen in the Gregg Court’s emphasis on a bifurcated trial (because jurors, 
despite instructions to the contrary, would likely be unable to disregard prejudicial materials 
presented purely for sentencing purposes), instructions to a jury cannot be expected to overcome 
inherent human nature and behavior. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 191 (1976). 
 169. This would require dismissing any jurors who disagreed with or seriously doubted the 
guilty verdict. 
 170. No published studies have been conducted regarding this phenomenon. In the absence of 
quantitative data, this is ultimately speculation. However, the inferences are fairly common sense. 
 171. It seems a logical inference that instructing the jurors to answer in the abstract, rather 
than specifically about the defendant, would be no more successful than instructing jurors to 
disregard prejudicial sentencing evidence presented in a nonbifurcated trial, pre-Gregg. 
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die?” The jurors who survive the death-qualification process would have 
already professed their willingness to impose the death penalty upon that 
specific individual, rendering death a foregone conclusion. Echoing 
Witherspoon’s declaration some thirty-five years ago, the court must not 
“entrust the determination of whether a man should live or die to a 
tribunal organized to return a verdict of death.”172 The result of death-
qualifying the jury after the guilt phase would be precisely that. 
C. A Proposal of a Better Option 
Perhaps the best approach to balancing the interests of the court, 
prosecution, and defense is a modification of Method One, the last option 
discussed. As explained,173 impaneling a single jury and death-
qualifying it after the guilt phase appears to solve many of the problems 
faced by a traditional unitary jury and avoids raising the problems a 
bifurcated jury presents, yet it also succumbs to an insurmountable 
obstacle by convening a tribunal foreordained to impose the death 
penalty on the specific defendant. The proposed modification would 
entail asking the death-qualification questions of the jury and the 
maximum number of alternates without actually striking jurors from the 
guilt panel. This would take place before the guilt phase begins, but after 
initial selection of the jury. The information is acquired from the jurors, 
but nothing is immediately done with it. Instead, the information is 
sealed away for the duration of the guilt phase. In the event of a 
conviction, the answers recorded in advance would then be used to 
appropriately modify the existing jury. Non-death-qualified jurors who 
sat for the guilt phase would be released from the panel and replaced by 
alternates who are death-qualified. The result would be a non-death-
qualified jury hearing the guilt phase, proceeded by a death-qualified 
jury that has experienced the entire trial sitting for the sentencing phase. 
That jury, now likely a mix of original jurors and alternates, has had the 
opportunity to observe the defendant for the entire duration of the trial 
and is privy to any residual doubt that may exist. 
In the possible event that not enough jurors are left once the death-
qualification criteria have been applied,174 the court could call an entirely 
new sentencing jury: again, as with the original Method One, the default 
 172. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521 (1968). 
 173. See supra notes 164–72 and accompanying text. 
 174. This potential problem can be addressed by including as many alternate jurors as 
possible. 
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would essentially be Method Two. This proposed solution is identical to 
Method One, except for the sequence of when the death-qualification 
questions are asked. Thus, it would be possible for the jurors to answer 
the death-qualification questions without having the specific defendant in 
mind, avoiding the fatal error that derails this option in its original 
form.175 Instead of asking jurors their views on the death penalty 
postconviction, when they know specifically who they are going to be 
sentencing, jurors would be asked before the guilt phase. Since the actual 
composition of the guilt phase panel has already been decided and will 
not be affected by the jurors’ responses, this solution can likely evade the 
primary concerns of racial underrepresentation and the accompanying 
inclination towards guilt since those opposed to the death penalty could 
still be present on the guilt-phase jury. While jurors would still be 
exposed to the death-qualification questions in advance of the guilt 
phase, the primary concerns are remedied.176
It would be necessary to death-qualify the jury only after impaneling 
it through traditional voir dire—the normal questioning that would take 
place in a noncapital murder case. To conduct the death-qualification 
before selecting the jury would reveal the jurors’ death penalty beliefs to 
the prosecution. The prosecution might then target those jurors, 
exercising preemptory challenges to exclude those individuals 
categorically opposed to the death penalty. The result would be the 
equivalent of a death-qualified jury, save the manner in which it is 
obtained. However, so long as the jury has already been seated and voir 
dire completed beforehand, the prosecution—and for that matter, the 
defense—would be unable to use the information gleaned via the death-
qualification questions to shape the composition of the jury for the guilt 
phase. The result is a jury formed through standard voir dire, lacking the 
predisposition for guilt found in a death-qualified jury. 
Additionally, death-qualifying only those jurors already impaneled, 
rather than the entire jury pool, serves judicial economy as well. Instead 
of the tremendous expense of resources the Green court sought to 
avoid,177 the expense would be minimal and confined to the twelve 
jurors and the alternates. At worst, if not enough jurors and alternates 
remain after applying the death-qualification information, the default of 
 175. See supra notes 171–72 and accompanying text. 
 176. Some have argued that merely being exposed to potential sentencing predisposes an 
assumption of guilt. See Cochran, supra note 10; Hubbard, supra note 62, at 197. 
 177. See United States v. Green, 343 F. Supp. 2d 23, 29–30 (D. Mass. 2004). 
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calling a new sentencing jury is virtually identical to Method Two, which 
the Green court adopted. 
One argument of death-qualification opponents might be that this 
approach still exposes potential jurors to the potential punishment, 
inadvertently leading jurors to believe the subtext of the voir dire is about 
appropriate punishment, rather than guilt or innocence.178 Furthermore, 
the two preliminary problems posed by the original version of this 
solution179—namely, that alternate jurors may be both subservient to the 
jurors who rendered the guilty verdict and may not share in that 
verdict—still exist. However, when the most disconcerting problems 
posed by a unitary jury—predisposition for guilt and difficulty in having 
adequate minority representation among the jurors180—are resolved by 
this technique in having a jury that is not death-qualified determine guilt 
or innocence, the presence of some shortcomings is both inevitable and 
relatively less significant.181 This solution potentially cures the most 
vexing problems—predisposition toward guilt and inadequate minority 
representation—that afflict the current death-qualification process. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As the imperfections of even the proposed final solution 
demonstrate, the practice of death-qualifying juries in bifurcated 
proceedings presents numerous challenges. Ultimately, it is a matter of 
delicately balancing the right of the state to death-qualify its jury and the 
defendant’s interest in receiving the fairest trial possible. The capital 
punishment system itself is far from perfect,182 as witnessed to by the 
 178. See supra notes 62, 146. 
 179. See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text. 
 180. See supra notes 63–83 and accompanying text. 
 181. Furthermore, it is also possible that the awareness of the potentially severe sentence may 
have a sobering effect upon jurors, enabling them to acquire a greater appreciation for the gravity of 
the task before them. See supra note 146. 
 182. See, e.g., John Ritter, Death Penalty Uneven Across USA, USA TODAY, Nov. 30, 2004, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-11-30-deathpenalty_x. 
htm. 
Dozens of mistakenly convicted death row prisoners have been freed in recent years. Two 
years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court banned executions of the mentally retarded. In 
Illinois, the outgoing governor in January 2003 cleared the nation’s eighth biggest death 
row. In June, New York’s highest court threw out the state’s death penalty law. Public 
approval of capital punishment has slid from 80% in 1994 to 66% a decade later, 
according to Gallup polls. 
Id. 
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number of overturned death row convictions in many states,183 and is 
frequently being challenged.184 Regardless of one’s individual stance 
regarding the propriety of the death penalty, few would argue that the 
accused should not be entitled to the utmost care and diligence in the 
pursuit of truth. In the larger scheme of capital punishment, the issue of 
death-qualified juries is a small, yet crucial, component. 
To quote an old adage, “It is better to free a guilty man than punish 
the innocent.”185 By pursuing a greater balance of interests in the death-
However, “the use of the death penalty in the United States has seen a dramatic resurgence 
over the past 25 years. There is little to suggest a reversal in this trend any time soon.” Ogloff, supra 
note 10, at 407. 
 183. “Since 1973, more than 110 individuals have been released from death rows in 25 
different states after evidence surfaced that they had not committed the crimes for which they stood 
condemned.” Charles S. Lanier & James R. Acker, Capital Punishment, the Moratorium Movement, 
and Empirical Questions: Looking Beyond Innocence, Race, and Bad Lawyering in Death Penalty 
Cases, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 577, 593 (2004) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Michael Graczyk, 
Texas Still No. 1 in Executions in 2004, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 21, 2004, (citing 
overturned death penalty convictions in Texas), available at 
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/apus_story.asp?category=1110&slug=Texas%20Executions; 
Joseph Neff, N.C. Prosecutors Stifled Evidence, NEWS & OBSERVER, 
http://newsobserver.com/news/story/1944568p-8304499c.html. 
 184. See Ogloff, supra note 10, at 386–87. 
[I]n May 1999 the Nebraska legislature approved a 2-year moratorium on the death 
penalty . . . . One year later, the New Hampshire legislature voted to abolish the death 
penalty . . . . Bills to abolish the death penalty were also introduced in Connecticut, 
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota. 
  Perhaps most significant to the moratorium movement was Illinois Governor 
George Ryan’s January 31, 2000 declaration of a statewide moratorium on all executions 
. . . .  
  Following Illinois’ moratorium in January 2000, legislators in Alabama, Kentucky, 
New Jersey, and Ohio introduced moratorium bills, and commissions to investigate the 
fairness of capital punishment were established in Arizona, Connecticut, Nebraska, 
Nevada, and North Carolina. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 185. See, e.g., Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997) (providing a 
general evaluation of the maxim’s history, merits, and follies across various cultures). But see C.J. 
May, Some Rules of Evidence: Reasonable Doubt in Civil and Criminal Cases, 10 AM. L. REV. 642, 
655 (1876) (criticizing and mocking the extension of the maxim too far): 
Better that any number of savings-banks be robbed than that one innocent person be 
condemned as a burglar! Better that any number of innocent men, women, and children 
should be waylaid, robbed, ravished, and murdered by wicked, wilful [sic], and depraved 
malefactors, than that one innocent person should be convicted and punished for the 
perpetration of one of this infinite multitude of crimes, by an intelligent and well-
meaning though mistaken court and jury! Better any amount of crime than one mistake in 
well-meant endeavors to suppress or prevent it! 
Id. 
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qualification process, hopefully it is possible to punish the guilty without 
inadvertently infringing on the rights of the innocent. 
Richard Salgado 
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